Throughout history, the question of the origin of morality has plagued the searching minds of every generation, and resultantly has proven itself an essential aspect of humanity. In the late eighteenth century, the philosopher Immanuel Kant defined morality as that which a person would only do while \u201cat the same time, will that it should become a universal law,\u201d explicitly adding that it cannot be grounded on empirical principles such as happiness (Kant). In the second half of the nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill presented a contradictory opinion that morality is completely and wholly based on the premise of happiness, stating that \u201cactions are right in proportion as they tend to produce happiness, and wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness\u201d (Mill, II). While several of Kant\u2019s reasons for the exclusion of empirical principles in the definition of morality are valid to a certain extent, I believe along with Mill that they have logical gaps that render the argument ultimately difficult to defend. It appears that in order to live by the premise that morality is defined by self-legislation of universal laws there would have to be human uniformity to a set of values. As history has proven, it is nearly impossible to define a set of principles upon which every human can confidently stand, except those of an empirical nature to which all can relate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
With these opinions so adamantly opposed, it is important to ensure an understanding of the foundational claims on both sides. Therefore, in the following paragraphs I will provide first a detailed description of Kant\u2019s opinion on the subject of empirical principles and morality, followed by an explanation of Mill\u2019s beliefs on the same matter. Finally, I will defend my own opinion by comparing the two. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
In the second part of Section II in The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, <\/em>Kant directly expresses his opinion on the invalidity of empirically-based morality. \u201cEmpirical principles are not fit to be the foundation of moral laws at all\u201d (Kant, 4:442). His reason for this claim is that there is no possible scenario in which they can be made a universally accepted law by all rational beings. This is because they are subject to change due to human nature and circumstance. He continues his argument by expressing that \u201chappiness is the most objectionable\u201d of them all (4:442) and he provides three reasons for this objection.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The first point he makes is that \u201cit is false\u201d because through his own observation and experience, he sees that the state of \u201cbeing well\u201d does not always coincide with the state of \u201cbehaving well\u201d (4:442). In other words, he understands that just because a person appears or even feels a sense of happiness, it does not necessarily signify that that individual is a morally good person. This is because, to Kant, morality is not grounded on feelings or experiences, but on rationality alone. The second point he makes is that \u201cit contributes nothing to the grounding of morality\u201d (4:442). He claims that it cannot be a part of defining the foundation of morality because the process of making a person happy has nothing to do with the process of making a person good. He implies that the process of obtaining happiness is founded on a desire to further one\u2019s own gain or advantage rather than a universally good virtue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The third point he makes is that happiness \u201cunderpins morality with incentives that undermine it and annihilate its sublimity\u201d (4:442). He explains that placing happiness at the center of morality in turn blurs the lines between virtue and vice because of the self-serving motives that consequentially develop behind them. In other words, it becomes very difficult to define what is virtue and what is vice when everyone bases morality on the causes of their own personal happiness, which diminishes the intrinsic worth of morality as a whole. Thus, Kant offers an extensive opinion on his disagreement with happiness at the center of defining morality. In his mind, it absolutely cannot be done because of the inherent selfish state within every rational being who, from their own diverse experience and circumstances, would distort morality under the premise of what personally makes them happy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the opening section of John Stuart Mill\u2019s book Utilitarianism,<\/em> Mill makes a claim against \u00e0 priori morality, and in particular, Kant\u2019s philosophy. After quoting Kant\u2019s universal imperative, he expresses that \u201c[Kant] fails, almost grotesquely, to show that there would be any contradiction, any logical (not to say physical) impossibility, in the adoption by all rational beings of the most outrageously immoral rules of conduct\u201d (Mill). In other words, he argues that there is no plausible way that all mankind could agree upon a logically deduced set of universal, moral principles. He therefore explains that empirical principles are the only possible grounds for morality. The empirical principle upon which Mill bases his argument of morality is happiness. Interestingly, he explains that while there has never been a set of morals universally adopted throughout history, there has been a consistent draw toward the abstract idea of morality in a broad sense. For this, Mill argues that \u201cthere ought\u2026to be some one fundamental principle or law, at the root of all morality\u201d (Mill). Since morality, as proven by history cannot be universally defined by \u00e0 priori, rational, or logically deduced principles, then it must be centered on an empirical principle to which everyone can relate: happiness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There are two main reasons that Mill provides for happiness being the ground of morality. The first is \u201cthat pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends\u201d (Mill). Here he explains that the root of every human longing is happiness, pleasure, and the absence of pain which, when examined in the light of history and personal experience, nearly every human can affirm. The second reason is \u201cthat all desirable things\u2026are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain\u201d (Mill). With happiness being the center of human desire and longing, Mill correlates its position to that of the \u201cfundamental principle or law at the root of all morality\u201d as previously mentioned. It is the one principle to which every action holds true\u2014people act to promote their happiness, the happiness of others, and to diminish the amount of pain for themselves and the aggregate. It is the center of morality because it is the center of human life\u2014people act in accordance with its laws, and therefore it must hold significant moral weight.<\/p>\n\n\n\n With these differences defined, it becomes fundamentally clear that the diverging point between the two philosophies is whether or not morality is founded on logic or empirical happiness. In his argument, Kant makes a valid claim in that \u201cbeing well [does not] always tall[y] with behaving well\u201d (Kant, 4:442). He also argues that using happiness as the basis of morality would obscure the term because of the differences of opinion regarding what causes happiness. It is true that happiness does not equal goodness, and also that different people take pleasure in different things. However, what Kant doesn’t seem to recognize is that happiness is more than mere self-seeking pleasure, an assumption to which he alludes in his arguments. When happiness is defined as Mill expresses it in his text, \u201cpleasure, and the absence of pain,\u201d especially when not focused on self but on the aggregate community, then it becomes clear that there is a lot more to the term that renders it a valid foundation upon which to build an argument for morality (Mill, II).\u00a0 By looking at happiness through this lens, Kant\u2019s arguments weaken.<\/p>\n\n\n\n His first point that happiness \u201cis false\u201d appears to be invalid because the experience of happiness under Mill\u2019s aggregate definition is familiar to every rational being, making it a true experience (Kant, 4:442). Similarly, the truth of it is evident when a person acts to bring happiness to another and the result is a natural inclination in the human mind to attribute such an act with goodness. The second point Kant makes, that happiness \u201ccontributes nothing to the grounding of morality,\u201d also appears invalid because under Mill\u2019s definition, the person who seeks to create the most amount of happiness for the most amounts of people cannot possibly be acting immorally, and therefore, his action toward the promotion of happiness must be grounds for overall morality (Kant, 4:442). Kant\u2019s third point that happiness \u201cunderpins morality with incentives that undermine it and annihilate its sublimity\u201d (4:442) is also made invalid under Mill\u2019s definition. This is because virtue and vice cannot possibly be misconstrued under the principle that people are to act in a manner that brings the most happiness to the majority of people. Working to develop the happiness of the aggregate is completely opposed to selfish ambition, which in actuality, seems to present the sturdiest foundation upon which the argument of morality could possibly be built.<\/p>\n\n\n\n October 2, 2018<\/p>\n\n\n\n Works Cited:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. <\/em>Translated by Mary Gregor; Jenns Timmermann. Cambridge University Press, <\/em>Cambridge, 2012.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism. <\/em>The Project Gutenberg EBook, 2004.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Throughout history, the question of the origin of morality has plagued the searching minds of every generation, and resultantly has proven itself an essential aspect of humanity. 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