{"id":268,"date":"2021-02-15T17:20:39","date_gmt":"2021-02-15T17:20:39","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/bexroden.com\/?p=268"},"modified":"2022-05-14T23:10:16","modified_gmt":"2022-05-14T23:10:16","slug":"an-argument-with-socrates","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/bexroden.com\/?p=268","title":{"rendered":"An Argument with Socrates"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

In book IV of The Republic,<\/em> the character, Socrates, defines three facets of the human soul: appetite, reason, and spirit. He argues that spirit, while frequently found partnering with the other two components, is its own separate entity that causes emotional provocation. While he defends the independence of spirit in relation to appetite and reason, it appears that it could objectionably be a product of either one, rather than its own personal entity. Socrates offers two arguments for the independence of spirit, which both leave room for speculation. In this essay, I explore the validity of Socrates\u2019 claim regarding the spirit component of the soul by deconstructing his appetitive and rational arguments for its independence. To do so, I outline, with a formal reconstruction, Socrates\u2019 entire argument regarding the makeup of the soul; then I provide an informal explanation of his reasoning behind it. I offer my own objections to his claims and speculate on a response that Socrates\u2019 would give me in return.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In his argument, Socrates uses many examples to justify his claims. Without covering the close exemplary details, his formal argument for the construction of the human soul can be outlined as follows:  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

  1. All mankind experiences appetitive drives based on desire. (437d)<\/li>
  2. There are times when, regardless of the expression of desire, an individual will refrain from appeasing their appetite by way of reason. (439b)<\/li>
  3. This differentiates two facets of the soul: the \u201cirrational appetitive part\u201d and the \u201crational part\u201d. (439d)<\/li>
  4. Emotions such as anger, sadness, or joy come from a spirited part of the soul. (439e)<\/li>
  5. This part cannot be of the appetite because there are times when mankind becomes angry at their appetite and rebukes it\u2014this sort of action could not occur if it were of the same part. (440b)<\/li>
  6. It also cannot be of reason because it is reason itself that calms severe anger (or any emotion) in the heart of man. (440d)<\/li>
  7. Thus, there are three parts to the human soul: the irrational appetitive part, the rational part, and the spirited part. (441a)<\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n\n

    Socrates grounds his argument of the soul\u2019s composition on a series of proofs, starting with the most evident aspect of humanity\u2014the appetite. He explains that these appetites, in their purest forms, are natural drives and desires of humanity, such as hunger and thirst. This part compels the soul toward raw, animalistic desire. He then explains that any drawback from the appetite\u2019s compulsion must spring from a separate entity all together; for \u201cit can\u2019t be that the same thing, with the same part of itself\u2026at the same time, does opposite things\u201d (439b). He explains only \u201crational calculation\u201d can cause a soul to resist its animalistic desires (439c). Therefore, concludes that along with the appetitive part of the soul, there is also a rational part.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    In defense of the third part of the soul, the spirit, Socrates provides examples to differentiate it from the appetite and reason. The first is a case where \u201cappetite forces someone contrary to rational calculation\u201d (440b). In response to this situation, the individual \u201creproaches himself\u201d in anger due to his lack of restraint (440b). This situation demonstrates that the spirit is not part of the appetite because, at times, it fiercely wars against it. The second is a case where an individual believes himself to have been treated unfairly. The spirit in this case would rise up in anger to justify himself until \u201ccalled to heel by the reason within him, like a dog by a shepherd\u201d (440d). Thus, the spirit cannot be a part of reason since it often acts contrary to reason as well, which solidifies Socrates\u2019 claim that there are three distinct parts to the human soul.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    While Socrates makes a strong point that the emotions aroused through the spirit often act contrary to the other facets of the soul, the contrary action in itself could be the very aspect that relates them to the others. Primarily, in Socrates\u2019 example about the individual reproaching his lack of restraint, it appears that this response could in itself be a result of reason guiding the individual. Socrates explains that reason is the force that leads people to act in opposition to their appetites, and if that is the case, this incident would be no different. Therefore, it appears that reason can manifest in rebuke or praise, depending on its congruence with the action of its host. Secondly, all emotion could be viewed as appetites in and of themselves that must be balanced and restrained with reason. Human tendency to lash out in emotion, whatever kind it may be, is a very animalistic trait that seems to correspond with appetite. It is a natural and beastly desire to allow emotions to drive decisions, and it can only be calmed by an individual with reason that contradicts it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    In response to my objections, Socrates would likely raise a few points. The first would be that spirit can never \u201cally itself with an appetite,\u201d especially when reason has dictated a contrary action (440b). Just as a guilty conscience or unjust treatment connects emotion to reason, spirit would tailor itself to reason\u2019s opinions and act accordingly, so spirit could not be connected to appetite. He would also present that from birth, children demonstrate full spirits while their rational abilities have not completely developed, so spirit could not possibly be connected to reason in itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The moments in which emotions tailor themselves to reason is a result of reason calming the appetitive emotions and setting them back in order. This again exemplifies the point previously made that natural emotion is an appetitive desire just like hunger and thirst, which points to the idea that spirit is not a separate entity in itself. In the same way, the spirit seen in children when they are born is natural, appetitive emotion that comes with being human. Children are less capable of restraining their emotions because they have not had years of experience in taming them as adults have had. Thus, it is not clear that spirit is in itself a separate entity from the other two, but in fact, appears to be a complementary facet of both.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    September 9, 2018<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Works Cited:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Plato. The<\/em> Republic. <\/em>Translated by G.M.A Grube. Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Indianapolis, 1992. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    In book IV of The Republic, the character, Socrates, defines three facets of the human soul: appetite, reason, and spirit. He argues that spirit, while frequently found partnering with the other two components, is its own separate entity that causes emotional provocation. While he defends the independence of spirit in relation to appetite and reason,…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"nf_dc_page":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[92,93,95,96,94],"class_list":["post-268","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-critical-analyses","tag-philosophy","tag-plato","tag-socrates","tag-spirit","tag-the-republic"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/bexroden.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/268","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/bexroden.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/bexroden.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bexroden.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bexroden.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=268"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/bexroden.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/268\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":553,"href":"https:\/\/bexroden.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/268\/revisions\/553"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/bexroden.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=268"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bexroden.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=268"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bexroden.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=268"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}